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ABSTRACT 
The Japanese authorities have been measuring since March 16
th
 the radiation level around the Fukushima 
nuclear plant as well as in the 46 other prefectures of the country. Considering these daily measurements 
of radiation level in the air, in fallout, tap water, dust, soil, leafy vegetables and seawater, we propose to 
assess the population exposure to the radioactivity by using Bayesian networks. Bayesian networks are 
handy thanks to their dynamic component, calculating probability distributions in accordance with the 
“system state” variable (in this case, the exposure of the population) over time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to quantify the health impact of the radioactive discharges. We will distinguish 
external exposure through inhalation of radionuclides from internal exposure through ingestion of 
contaminated water or food because internal exposure is 20 times more dangerous than an external one. 
Because of the uncertainty due to the health impact assessment, the methodology chosen is a probabilistic 
modelling with Bayesian networks. More precisely, we are going to use a Dynamic Bayesian Network 
(DBN) enabling us, informed of the population exposure at some point, to simulate its evolution over time 
and then to detect when the threshold of 1 Sievert (at which the effects on health appear) is reached. We 
also hope to be able to answer the following question: depending on the areas, which contamination mode 
could be most important (external, internal or both)? Our goal is to define the areas to which the Japanese 
health authorities should really pay attention in the future in order to prevent as much as possible diseases 
related to exposure to radionuclides such as iodine-131 or cesium-137.  
 
 
2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN THE JAPANESE PREFECTURES 
Starting this analysis, we do not know which areas are most affected: this is the reason why we decided to 
take into account all the Japanese Prefectures (Map 1). The radioactivity level measurements in the air 
have been recorded hourly in the prefectural capitals’ city halls by the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology in Japan (MEXT)
1
. These measurements relate to the dose rate, 
meanwhile the integrated dose is the sum of the total hourly measurements recorded over a one-month 
period since measurements began (on March 16th), representing 34 968 data. Knowing the dose rates and, 
then, the integrated doses, we will be able to estimate population exposure. 
 
2.1. Air 
The highest value (2183 μ Sv) is of course observed in the Fukushima Prefecture. The neighboring 
prefecture, Ibaraki, recorded the second highest value (153 μ Sv), although it is 10 times less than in the 
Fukushima Prefecture. The integrated dose in Miyagi and Tochigi is similar (80 μ Sv). Although in their 
northern part Ibaraki and Tochigi Prefectures are contiguous with the Fukushima one, their distance from 
                                                          
1 http://www.mext.go.jp/english/incident/1303962.htm 
  
the NPP (200 & 170 km), possibly their mountains, such as Shirane (2,578 m), Nantai (2,484 m) and 
Nasudake (1,917 m), (by blocking the radioactivity-carrying winds) and above all the fact that they are not 
under the plume, protect them from a higher level of radiation. We guess the Miyagi Prefecture location, 
which is a little further inland and somewhat outlying from the plume, as we can see on the picture below, 
could also explain the low levels of integrated dose despite the proximity to the NPP (58 km). 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47
(µ
 S
v
)
Prefectures
Integrated dose (reported by prefecture)
(from 3/17/11 to 4/17/11) 
         
Chart 1: Air integrated dose reported by prefecture           Figure 1: Position of Miyagi, Google map 3D  
 
Based on modelling performed by IRSN
2
 on the dispersion of radioactive releases into the atmosphere 
across Japan between March 12
th
 and March 25
th
, we know that “the plume headed in directions that have 
varied over time according to the meteorology: north-east until March 14
th
, to the south and south-
westerly direction towards Tokyo (March 15
th
), then eastward toward the Pacific. From March 20
th
 and 
during the following days the plume was directed at the inland in a changing way (especially in Tokyo in 
March 23
rd) but also towards the northwest.” 
 
2.2. Fallout 
The radioactive particles can fall to the ground as dry deposition or be swept away by rising air currents 
and fall quite far from their origin through rain or snow (wet deposition). That is why the spatial 
distribution of iodine-131 and cesium-137 in fallout overflows was first observed in the air.  
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Chart 2: Fallout integrated dose reported by prefectures 
The Ibaraki Prefecture (8) is very affected (211 936 MBq/km
2
)
3
, followed by the Tokyo Prefecture (13) 
(84 834 Mbq/km
2
) which is 225 km away from the NPP, and the Yamagata (6), Saitama (11), Tochigi (9), 
Chiga (12) and Gumma (10) Prefectures. Fallouts were most significant on 21
st
 March due to the 
combined effect of the north wind and rain as we can see from the table below: 
                                                          
2 http://www.irsn.fr 
3 Data for Fukushima Prefecture were only available from March 29th but we have more accurate data thanks to the monitors 
deployed in the Fukushima prefecture as you can see in subsection  3.2. 
  
 
Prefecture 
Iodine 
131 
MBq/km
2
 
Cesium 
137 
MBq/km
2
 
Ibaraki  93 000  13 000  
Yamagata  58 000  4 300  
Saitama 7 200  790  
Tochigi 5 300  250  
Gunma 3 700  320  
Tokyo 2 900  560  
 
Table 1: The Prefectures most affected by fallouts on March 21
st
 
 
These fallouts explain, of course, the contamination in drinking water (deposits in waterbodies which 
water is captured for water supply of cities) and fresh products (vegetables which leaves will capture 
radionuclides) and, then, the contamination of milk and meat through the animals that graze, this is the 
way of internal contamination. The internal exposure is then evaluated by the rate of fallouts as we are not 
able to estimate if the population would be in the coming years apart from contaminated products
4
. 
Futhermore, the Fukushima’s food self sufficiency ratio is 85%. Thus, 163 000 becquerels of radioactive 
cesium-137 per kilogram were detected on March 23
rd 5
, in the soil of the Iitate village (40 km northwest 
from the plant) which is very impacted by the fallouts. 
 
2.3. Water 
The cumulative radiation level in drinking water reported by prefecture is unsurprisingly quite similar to 
the fallout one.  
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Chart 3: Drinking water integrated dose reported by prefecture 
Measurements in water have been conducted once per day since March 19
th
. If levels of radioactive iodine 
rise over 100 Bq/l, it is recommended not to use tap water for preparing baby milk formula. Indeed, 
children under one year are most sensitive to iodine. As far as adults are concerned, the threshold is 300 
Bq/l for iodine (and 200 Bq/l for cesium, never reached). Between March 19
th
 and April 19
th
, the threshold 
of 100 Bq/l has been exceeded only once on March 25
th
 (110 Bq/l) in Tochigi Prefecture (9). Since March 
30
th
, iodine rates fell sharply because iodine remains in the water for a while (the radioactivity period of 
iodine is low: -50% each 8.5 days). From May 1
st
, iodine and cesium are no longer detectable in Japanese 
prefectures’ water. The above chart gives an indication of the cumulative dose of iodine and cesium in the 
different Japanese prefectures’ drinking water. The most affected by iodine-131 are Tochigi (476 Bq/l), 
Ibaraki (376 Bq/l), Fukushima (252 Bq/l)
6
, Tokyo (218 Bq/l) and Saitama (215 Bq/l). 
                                                          
4 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20110713a1.html 
5 http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/23_28.html 
6 Missing data in Fukushima Prefecture 
  
In conclusion of these initial tests conducted across all Japanese prefectures, we can differentiate 
populations of Fukushima and Ibaraki who are both externally (air) and internally (fallout, water) exposed 
to radioactivity, meanwhile the populations of Tochigi, Tokyo, Saitama are mainly internally exposed 
(fallout, water) and those of the provinces of Yamagata, Gumma, Chiga “only”exposed to fallout. 
Many measurement points were set up in the Fukushima Prefecture in order to analyze the radioactivity in 
the air
7
, dust, soil, vegetables and sea. 
 
3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN THE FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE 
3.1 Air  
43 sampling points have been monitored out of the twenty-kilometer area. MEXT has been recording four 
times per day (10 a.m., 1 p.m., 4 p.m., & 7 p.m.).  7 p.m. has been selected as reference time because we 
noted that it is at that moment that the radioactivity tends to be higher (likely due to an accumulation 
effect in the sea that goes back inland through the sea breeze). We have then extended these measurements 
to the whole day. We classified items according to their distance from the NPP and we noticed that 
radiations do not spread concentrically depending on the distance but depending on the wind directions. 
Every point under the dominant wind flow (North West) is therefore under the plume and is then 
characterized by higher levels of radioactivity. Thus, the chart below shows that even the closest sampling 
points (20 km) if outside of this main direction (NW) are the less affected, and two points at the same 
distance will not be affected in the same way (i.e. sampling points n.32 - 39290 µ Sv and n.42 - 1244 µ 
Sv). This questions the geometric areas that have been drawn and have influenced the decisions to 
evacuate the population living within 30 km from the plant. In the emergency context, the Japanese 
authorities have relied on what had been done in Chernobyl, but it is now time to clarify these areas. 
Indeed, the population living at 30 km NW from the NPP has not been obliged to evacuate when it is one 
that is most affected.  
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Chart 4: Air integrated dose in Fukushima Prefecture 
 
3.2 Dust, soil, leafy vegetable and sea water contamination 
The dust can lead to contaminate the ground and then the food chain (vegetables, animals, milk). Dust has 
been collected over 26 sampling points since March 19th; chart 5 illustrates the radioactivity concentration 
average in the dust. Once again the concentration level does not vary linearly with the distance from the 
source but depending on the northwest flow. The highest reading (555 Bq/m
3
 of iodine-131) is obtained at 
2-7 point (35 km NW, Date county) on March 25th (3 p.m.). Note that the highest average (47 Bq/m
3
 of 
iodine 131 at point 1-5) was obtained due to a peak on March 23rd at 1 p.m.: 530 Bq/m
3
 of iodine-131, 
while the following measurement (2 p.m.) only indicates 180 Bq/m
3
.
 
On March 24th at 10 a.m., it dropped 
to 5.9 Bq/m
3
. This shows that rates can vary quite rapidly from one hour to another because of sporadic 
releases from the NPP and because the radioactivity is very volatile. It can vary considerably from one 
point to another in the same city. There are two measurement sites in the city of Kawamata Yamakiya 
(sampling points 2-7): one with averages of 21 Bq/m
3
 of iodine-131 and 0.64 Bq/m
3 
of cesium-137, the 
other one with respectively 30 Bq/m
3
 of iodine and 26 Bq/m
3
 of cesium. Then the roughness of the 
geographic space or microclimatology seem to play an important role in the spatial distribution of 
radioactivity.  
                                                          
7 No detailed data for drinking water  
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    Chart 5: Radioactivity concentration in dust         Chart 6: Radioactivity concentration in soil 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
R
ad
io
ac
ti
v
it
y
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 (
B
q
/k
g
)
Sampling points
Leaf  Vegetable (Fukushima Prefecture)
(from 3/18/11 to 4/20/11)
Iodine 131
Cesium 137
 
             Chart 7: Radioactivty concentration in leafy vegetables 
 
As far as the soil is concerned, 38 sampling points have been measured since March 23rd. The max value 
is obtained at 106 point (520 000 Bq/kg of iodine-131) and at 3-5 point with 770 000Bq/kg of cesium-137, 
but the former value is the result of only one measurement and thus does not give a right idea of this item. 
On March 20th in upland soil of Iitate village (40km NW), the radioactivity concentration of iodine-131 
was 1 170 000 Bq.kg (for 16 000 Bq.kg of cesium-137). Therefore, the radioactivity concentration in leafy 
vegetables measured over 14 sampling points tends to follow the previous dust and soil charts where the 
peaks are observed for NW or SW direction. 
 
Due to the massive releases in the ocean of radioactive water used to cool the nuclear reactors, MEXT has 
measured since March 23
rd
 twelve sampling points at different depth levels (over the sea up to 172 m).  
The iodine contamination will have less impact than cesium: iodine will indeed be quickly dispersed due 
to its low half life, while the cesium will remain active for a long time (30 years) with a contamination risk 
of the food chain (concentration factor and therefore bioaccumulation of 400 for fish). Items 4 and 5 in 
front of the plant are the most affected (averages over 200 Bq/l of cesium). Which confirms contamination 
due to the releases of water used to cool the reactors, and more so it was only on April 16
th
 contamination 
suddenly increased to point 4 (Cs-137 undersea outer layer 186 Bq/l). Since May 6
th
, cesium appears in 
marine soil at 93.9 Bq/g at 31 m’s depth and 32.3 Bq/g at another point at 117 m’s depth8. 
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Map 1: Seawater, MEXT               Chart 8: Radioactivity Concentration in seawater 
 
                                                          
8 http://www.mext.go.jp/component/english/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/05/06/1305745_0506.pdf 
  
Knowing the levels of radioactivity to which the population was exposed during the first month, it is time 
to assess the health impact of these releases. 
 
 
4. HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
After discharges the radioactivity in the air decreases with time, what is known as radioactive decay. Only 
in the early days when the releases were significant could the population be exposed to high doses. Rates 
are now lower. In fact, the population will be exposed to low doses of radioactivity for at least 60 years, 
since cesium has a period of 30.5 years after which its activity decreases by half. 
 
4.1 Evaluation of annual external exposure 
External exposure means doses are likely to be received on the whole body in the absence of protection 
from discharges. To assess as precisely as possible the annual external exposure, we conducted the 
following operations: the natural radioactivity of each prefecture has been subtracted from the integrated 
dose. Indeed, we are subject to natural radioactivity which is estimated to 2 400 mSv/year on the surface 
of the Earth: it may be much higher in some areas (Ramsar in Iran, Kerala in India, Guarapari region in 
Brazil) where high levels of radioactivity are recorded without excess of diseases. The body seems to 
adapt itself to this environment; furthermore natural radioactivity is less dangerous than the artificial one. 
Natural radioactivity is about 1 500 mSv/year in Japan but varies greatly from one prefecture to another. 
MEXT actually gives a range of values: eg Fukushima (0037-0046) is expressed in mSv/hr, and for each 
prefecture, we took the lowest in order not to underestimate the artificial radioactivity. We converted 
natural radiation into hours for 1 month because the artificial radioactivity (integrated dose) is calculated 
this way. In order not to overestimate the artificial exposure during 1 year (radioactive decay), we took the 
most recent available data of radioactivity in the air (25
th
 May), multiplied it by 30.5 (number of days in 
one month), then by 11 months and added the first month’s integrated dose, which gives us the external 
exposure per year. 
 
4.2 Evaluation of annual internal exposure 
As regards internal exposure due to fallouts
9
 in the prefectures, we converted the integrated dose of 
fallouts from MBq/km
2
 units into µSv/hour, using the formula provided by the National Institute of 
Radiological Sciences of Japan: 2.6MBq/km
2
 of iodine 131 exposure equals 0.0000031 µSv/h and 
2.3 MBq/km
2
 of cesium equals 0.0000040 µSv/h. Results have subsequently been extended to 12 months 
in order to get an annual exposure again. Data collected in Fukushima Prefecture on leafy vegetables are 
not expressed in MBq/km
2
 but in Bq/kg, which represents the activity. Again we had to convert the Bq/kg 
into mSv using dose factors that are 0.000022 for iodine-131 and 0.000014 for cesium. The result was 
then converted into µSv in order to add the values of external exposure. 
 
Having now µSv on both sides (external and internal exposure) we can add the two exposure types to get 
an idea of the population total exposure over one year. We can now calculate the committed dose for 
children, corresponding to the radiation levels to which they will be exposed in 70 years (assuming they 
are still living in Fukushima prefecture). The committed doses are expressed in mSv; they have been 
converted into Sievert knowing that for every Sv the likelihood of developing cancer increases by 5%
10
. 
Two approaches can be used to assess effects on health: a deterministic approach where one tries to 
quantify the effects from the point of view of their seriousness and a stochastic approach, adopted here, 
which evaluates the effects from the point of view of their probability of occurrence. Being exposed to 
radiations over a long period of time and being strongly exposed do not have the same impact on the body 
because DNA is going to repair the radiation effect but, step by step, DNA will get tired, will become 
brittle and breaks will finally appear promoting carcinogenesis.  
 
 
                                                          
9
 we are aware that there is a bias because we do not have data at the prefectural level for activity in vegetables as in Fukushima, 
but only the fallouts 
10 ICRP, 2005. Low-dose Extrapolation of Radiation-related Cancer Risk. ICRP Publication 99. Ann. ICRP 35 (4) 
  
4.3 Calculation of cancer probability increase by Dynamic Bayesian Network 
Featuring internal (INT EXP 1Y Sv) and external (EXT EXP 1Y Sv) exposure of the population over one 
year and thus their total exposure (TOTAL EXP 1Y 1 Sv), a Dynamic Bayesian Network will calculate 
the committed dose for children over 70 years (TOTAL EXP 1Y Sv t + 1) and the likelihood of related 
cancer (PROBA CHILD CANCER) (Figure 2). This calculation was performed at the prefectural level 
but, at this scale, only the Fukushima prefecture is around the threshold of 1 Sv (0.9922). The analysis will 
therefore focus on the different sampling points in Fukushima prefecture. It appears from this analysis that 
54.55% of the measured points have increased probabilities of developing cancer in the range of 51% and 
185.768%, and for 22.73% of the points the odds are increased in a range that varies between 337.143 and 
486.167%. The question is: where are these points located? If they are in the 20-km area where the 
population was evacuated, this will not impact on health; if they are located in the area between 20 and 30 
km where only containment recommendations have been taken, and even more beyond 30 km, there will 
be an impact. 
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Figure 2: Dynamic Bayesian Network, (BayesiaLab 5.0.2)           Chart 9: Probability of cancer 
 
 
As we can see from the chart, beyond 30 km, probabilities for the population of developing cancer due to 
the artificial radioactivity are obviously weaker than within the 30-km area (average of 1 271%) but they 
are far from being insignificant (581% point 36-  40 km NW, 533% point 2-  55km NW, 471% point 3-  
45 km NW, etc ...). Note that most of these points are oriented NW and are thus under the dominant wind 
flow as noted above. It is in those places where no protective measures have been taken so far that health 
monitoring must be done in the coming years, especially in children who are most susceptible to iodine-
131 (thyroid cancer) and cesium-137 (childhood leukemia). Protective measures should be envisaged in 
this area by November 2011 when the threshold of 1 Sv will be reached since these annual exposure 
values of these points are between 1.34 and 1.66 Sv. 
 
 
 Map 2: The results of chart 9, map adapted from the Remy Scoccimaro’s map 
(http://japgeo.free.fr/Sendai/FukushimaKen.png) 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The problem of boundaries arises in an accurate way: boundaries are drawn to manage the space but could 
also have health impacts on people as they are not required to be confined while the above-mentioned 
  
areas are more exposed than others which are closer to the NPP. Taking into account other factors than the 
euclidean distance, such as the microclimatology, should help refine the boundaries in order to better 
match the actual exposure of populations. There is also the problem of access to data at a detailed level 
(municipalities) because the real interest of DBN would have been to contextualize the probability of 
developing cancer by variables related to the age of the population, number of children, number of 
women, type of dwelling (wooden, concrete) and agricultural activities (dairy products, vegetables, 
fisheries), but unfortunately we did not have access to those data. 
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